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Since the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, federal policy has
revolutionized employment rights. Equal employment opportunity
law, occupational safety and health legislation, and fringe beneﬁts
regulation were designed to create employee rights to equal protec-
tion, to health and safety, and to the beneﬁts employers promise. In
event-history analyses of data from 279 organizations, this research
ﬁnds that these legal changes stimulated organizations to create per-
sonnel, antidiscrimination, safety, and beneﬁts departments to man-
age compliance. Yet as institutionalization proceeded, middle man-
agers came to disassociate these new ofﬁces from policy and to
justify them in purely economic terms, as part of the new human
resources management paradigm. This pattern is typical in the
United States, where the Constitution symbolizes government rule
of industry as illegitimate. It may help to explain the long absence
of a theory of the state in organizational analysis and to explain a
conundrum noted by state theorists: the federal state is administra-
tively weak but normatively strong.
INTRODUCTION
How does the weak and fragmented U.S. state inﬂuence employers? Until
the 1970s, sociologists tended to treat organizations as closed systems, im-
mune from external inﬂuence. Economists were more attuned to inter-
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organizational exchanges but treated government as a transient and usu-
ally illegitimate inﬂuence on the market. The new organizational
institutionalism broke with these traditions by conceptualizing the state
as an important force shaping organizations (Meyer and Rowan 1977; Di-
Maggio and Powell 1983). The rediscovery of the state, encouraged by a
renewed emphasis on polities in other areas of sociology (Evans,
Rueschemeyer, and Skocpol 1985), has had a salutary corrective effect on
organizational research. Recent research shows that, in the United States,
several distinct features of the federal government—its structurally lim-
ited administrative capacity, dispersal of authority across levels of govern-
ment, decentralization of decision making at the national level, and ideo-
logical deference to the efﬁciency of the market and the natural virtues of
civil society—inﬂuence how it regulates organizational life (Meyer 1983;
Hamilton and Sutton 1989; Dobbin 1994). The state issues ambiguous
mandates to organizations, changes rules frequently in response to pro-
tracted political negotiations and litigation, and enforces its rules in a frag-
mented and indecisive way. Although these features cause it to appear
weak, we argue that they produce a peculiar kind of state strength. First,
because the state leaves the terms of legal compliance unclear, organiza-
tions commit considerable resources to devising compliance measures.
Second, because the state signals uncertainty about the legitimacy of its
own authority,organizationsdevelop rationales for thosecompliance solu-
tions that locate authority in the market.
We analyze the effects of the federal employment rights revolution of
the early 1970s, which revolved around equal employment opportunity
(EEO), health and safety, and beneﬁts initiatives. Previous studies have
documented that EEO law was characterized by policy ambiguity and
complexity, by a gradual expansion in scope, and by administrative frag-
mentation (Dobbin et al. 1988; Edelman 1990; Skrentny 1996). We show
that these regulatory features also characterized safety and beneﬁts initia-
tives and that employers responded in like ways to all three initiatives.
In all three realms, the state left implementation largely to managers and
experts. The uncertainties raised by legal reforms created opportunities
for ambitious personnel managers to expand their purview and contrib-
uted to the rise of the human resources management (HRM) paradigm.
We use retrospective data to show that these initiatives led employers to
establish entire new departments dedicated to HRM, EEO, health and
safety, and beneﬁts. We show that the diffusion of these departments ac-
combe, John Skrentny, Bruce Western, James Wooten, and the AJS reviewers for
suggestions. Correspondence may be directed to Frank Dobbin, Department of Sociol-
ogy, Princeton University, 2-N-2 Green Hall, Princeton, New Jersey 08544-1010.
E-mail: dobbin@princeton.edu
442Strength of a Weak State
celerated after new federal initiatives and that they appeared ﬁrst in orga-
nizations that were vulnerable to governmental scrutiny.
Our central contribution is to document how the U.S. regulatory frame-
work leads managers to recast policy-induced structures in the mold of
efﬁciency. This is the key to the peculiar strength of America’s weak state.
Middle managers soon retheorized these ofﬁces with business and market
rationales, describing them not as means to compliance with federal regu-
lations but as cost-effective administrative solutions to problems of
worker loyalty and productivity. As a consequence, employers continued
to adopt these ofﬁces even after Reagan curtailed enforcement of the laws
that had popularized them. We suggest that, in the United States, justiﬁ-
cations for policy-induced measures drift toward efﬁciency in this way
because constitutional constraints on federal authority symbolize govern-
ment control of industry as illicit. Compliance measures are thereafter
sustained not merely by ephemeral public policies but by transcendental
economic laws.
Our argument engages debates about the character of the U.S. state
(e.g., Skowronek 1982) and its comparative strength (e.g., Evans et al.
1985). How can the state be administratively weak but normatively
strong? How, in other words, can a state with such meager administrative
resources shape society so effectively? We argue that the administrative
weakness of the state is the cause of its normative strength, for this weak-
ness ensures that Americans will come to see civil society and the market
as the sources of social phenomena that are in fact generated by the state.
Thus, in the case at hand, constitutional restrictions on federal power that
cause Congress to issue complex and ambiguous regulations, forcing em-
ployers to devise their own compliance measures, also symbolize federal
rule of private enterprise as illicit, encouraging employers to invent efﬁ-
ciency rationales to explain those measures. The Constitution expresses
the dangers of state domination of civil society and encourages Americans
to see organizational practices and social customs that originate in state
action as part of the natural order of things.
After sketching our conceptual argument, we chronicle how U.S. em-
ployers responded to new federal initiatives, spelling out hypotheses about
where and when they responded by creating new ofﬁces. We then review
alternative explanations of the creation of ofﬁces that emphasize scale
economies, unionization, transaction costs, and regulatory effort. Finally,
we present multivariate analyses of the diffusion of employment-related
ofﬁces. We observe 279 employers, many too small to divide personnel
functions. Between the mid-1960s and the mid-1980s, personnel/HRM
ofﬁces doubled in popularity to 70% of the sampled employers, beneﬁts
ofﬁces doubled to 35%, health and safety ofﬁces doubled to over 30%,
and equal employment units appeared in 40%.
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THE EMPLOYMENT RIGHTS REVOLUTION
Since the early 1960s, much of the elaboration of human rights has taken
place in the realm of employment. Congress has sought to extend rights
to life and liberty (via health and safety regulation), equal protection (via
equal opportunity law), and social citizenship (via regulations insuring
fringe beneﬁts) to employees. While these protections are so unevenly in-
stitutionalized that they scarcely deserve to be called rights, they nonethe-
less represent a dramatic change.
None of the legislation encouraged employers to establish new ofﬁces,
yet, by about 1980, large employers had come to see ofﬁces of health and
safety, beneﬁts, and equal employment as imperative. These events follow
a pattern found in early employment regulation. Ambiguous and complex
regulations lead employers to create new departments to manage compli-
ance, and soon, specialists promote these departments as all-purpose solu-
tions to management problems. Conﬂict over the Wagner Act of 1935 led
employers to establish industrial relations (IR) ofﬁces and systems, which
IR specialists soon promoted for their labor management functions even
to nonunion ﬁrms (Selznick 1969; Kochan, Katz, and McKersie 1986, p.
45). Complex labor controls during World War II led employers to estab-
lish bureaucratic personnel ofﬁces and systems, which personnel special-
ists heralded for their capacity to rationalize hiring and promotion even
after wartime labor controls were removed (Baron, Dobbin, and Jennings
1986). Similarly, federal regulations of the early 1970s led employers to
establish special compliance ofﬁces, which experts then promoted widely
for their capacity to optimize human resources and win worker loyalty.
The Character of U.S. Employment Law
Four characteristics of U.S. employment law contributed to the pattern
we describe. First, the ambiguity and complexity of compliance standards
led executives to believe that they would need experts to devise manage-
ment practices that would comply with the law (Edelman 1992). Ambigu-
ity and complexity result from the weak mandate the Constitution’s com-
merce clause gives Congress to govern private enterprise and the
jurisdictional complexity caused by the separation of powers. Second, the
expanding scope of the law in each realm led executives to believe that
they would need permanent ofﬁces to track legal changes and devise com-
pliance schemes. The law tends to expand because the presidential system
encourages compromise legislation and because autonomous administra-
tive and judicial branches are responsible for interpreting its meaning.
Third, the fragmented nature of regulation led executives to conclude that
organizations would need not merely general compliance ofﬁces but spe-
cial antidiscrimination, beneﬁts, and health and safety ofﬁces to (in the
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new jargon) “interface” with different regulatory agencies. In the United
States, each organization is “likely to have ofﬁcers that symbolize safety,
the environment, afﬁrmative action” to handle interactions with the frag-
mented bureaucracy (Meyer and Scott 1992, p. 275). Finally, antistatist
elements of the state encouraged management specialists, intent on justi-
fying their own positions, to retheorize their new ofﬁces in efﬁciency terms
and to disassociate them from policy. The Constitution’s separation of
powers, dispersion of political authority to communities, and limits on
federal power symbolize state domination of private enterprise as illicit
and inefﬁcient. As Jackall found in studying employer safety practices of
the 1970s, “productive return is the only rationale that carries weight
within the corporate hierarchy” (1983, p. 58). In consequence, the very
journals that in 1975 advised executives to establish specialty ofﬁces to
pursue legal compliance were by 1985 arguing that these ofﬁces helped
to rationalize the management of human resources.
Professional groups were at the heart of these developments. Human
resources specialists, beneﬁts accountants, tax lawyers, safety engineers,
and equal employment managers saw in employment legislation new pos-
sibilities for professional growth. They insisted to top managers that new
ofﬁces could ensure legal compliance, exaggerating the risk of litigation
to win organizational resources (see Edelman, Abraham, and Erlanger
1992). In recasting these departments in terms of efﬁciency, middle man-
agers played to top managers’ preoccupation with the bottom line and
desire to avoid costs associated with legal compliance.
While we cannot undertake a comparative analysis here, we emphasize
that the administratively weak U.S. state differs in signiﬁcant ways from
administratively strong states, among which France is often cited as the
paragon. The French state differs on the four characteristics we identiﬁed.
First, because its constitution does not severely limit state control of pri-
vate enterprise or fully separate state powers, the French state tends to
mandate substantive employment outcomes rather than creating ambigu-
ous and complex regulations (Cummins 1986). For instance, whereas the
U.S. state vaguely outlawed discrimination against the handicapped, the
French state instructed employers to set aside 3% of jobs for them (Levy
1974). As a consequence, until very recently, French ﬁrms had not devel-
oped the kinds of internal legal codes of employment that U.S. ﬁrms devel-
oped (Gavini 1997; Sutton et al. 1994). Second, because the semipresiden-
tial system creates a strong president and a uniﬁed prime minister,
parliament, and administration (a “fusion of powers”), French employ-
ment laws are not typically compromise measures that undergo gradual
legislative and administrative expansion after passage (Duhamel 1987;
Lovecy 1992). For instance, the French state established safety standards,
but it has avoided the gradual elaboration of administrative guidelines,
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covering hundreds of toxins, that occurred in the United States (Brickman
and Jasanoff 1980). Third, because the state is centralized, administration
of employment policy is situated in the Ministry of Labor rather than
fragmented in a series of autonomous agencies (Meyer 1983). This discour-
ages the fragmentation of the employment function within ﬁrms. Fourth,
because France’s constitution does not contain severe restrictions on gov-
ernment power, it does not symbolize state power as illicit in the way
that the U.S. Constitution does (Dobbin 1994). In consequence, French
managers face less pressure to recast policy-induced activities in terms of
pure efﬁciency.
ORGANIZATIONAL RESPONSE TO EEO, OSHA, AND ERISA
From the early 1970s, management specialists argued that employers
would need ofﬁces staffed by experts to comply with new laws. From the
early 1980s, they borrowed rhetoric from the emerging human resources
management paradigm toargue that these ofﬁces improved efﬁciency gen-
erally. Next, we chronicle these events to develop speciﬁc hypotheses
about the effects of legal shifts, in the process considering the mediating
effects of public accountability, organizational age, and employer links to
professional groups. In this section, we use John Stuart Mill’s (1988 [1974])
method of similarity to show that in three different policy realms, similar
regulatory conditions produced similar organizational responses.
The Ambiguity and Complexity of Compliance
Compliance standards in each of these realms were ephemeral, because
the law created abstract rights and proscribed various abuses rather than
prescribing employer behavior. Civil Rights law established a right to
nondiscrimination without specifying how that right was to be protected.
Safety and health law established a right to a safe and healthy workplace
and deﬁned conditions that threatened employees but did not specify how
employers should prevent these conditions. Pension reform law estab-
lished a right to promised fringe beneﬁts and complex regulations to en-
force that right but did not impose a uniform structure for pensions or
other beneﬁts. Employers established specialty departments to devise
compliance strategies.
Ambiguity in EEO and AA law.—In 1961, John F. Kennedy’s Execu-
tive Order (EO) 10925 encouraged federal contractors to take “afﬁrmative
action” to reverse the effects of past discrimination, and in 1965, Lyndon
Johnson’s EO 11246 expanded the order and created the Ofﬁce of Federal
Contract Compliance Programs (OFCCP) to enforce it. In 1964, Title VII
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of the Civil Rights Act prohibited all private employers with 15 or more
employees from discriminating on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or
national origin and created the Equal Employment Opportunity Commis-
sion (EEOC) to enforce the law (Burstein 1985; Edelman 1990).
Neither Kennedy nor Johnson deﬁned “afﬁrmative action” in their or-
ders to federal contractors, and neither established practical guidelines.
Likewise, Title VII made discrimination illegal but did not deﬁne it. The
act appeared to cover employment practices intentionally designed to dis-
criminate (see Shaeffer 1973, p. 65). Most employers had little idea that
the law might apply to them. During the 1960s, the ambiguity of these
laws caused only modest concern among employers because sanctions
were rare. In the early 1970s, enforcement was increased in both realms,
but little was done to clarify the terms of compliance. EEO enforcement
was increased by the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, which
extended coverage to very small employers and gave the EEOC power
to bring lawsuits itself (Skrentny 1996, p. 127). This came in the wake of
the Supreme Court’s 1971 Griggs v. Duke Power decision, which ruled
illegal employment tests that had a “disparate impact” on different groups
absent evidence of intentional discrimination. The number of Title VII
suits skyrocketed, from several hundred a year in the early 1970s to over
5,000 a year in the late 1970s (Burstein and Monaghan 1986). Employers
now paid close attention to EEO law (see Petersen 1974).
The OFCCP’s Order 4, revised in late 1971, expanded afﬁrmative ac-
tion coverage to small federal contractors and subcontractors. The major-
ity of U.S. enterprises were now subject to afﬁrmative action law—80%
according to a 1973 estimate (Stryker 1996, p. 16). The order required
contractors to submit detailed statistical reports and to write annual “af-
ﬁrmative action programs,” specifying goals and timetables (Shaeffer
1973, p. 11; Edelman 1992, p. 1537; DuRivage 1985, p. 362). Order 4 re-
quired employers to redress inequality but did not clarify how they were
to do so beyond stipulating that they could not use rigid hiring quotas.
From 1972, employers were expected to invent EEO and AA compli-
ance strategies that would stand up in court, but the courts repeatedly
ﬂip-ﬂopped on standards of compliance. As one popular personnel man-
agement text warned, “judges interpret [EEO] law differently, and deci-
sions are often reversed in higher courts” (Burack and Smith 1977, p. 183).
Management journals extolled voluntary hiring quotas, written job tests
to ensure objective selection of employees, and bureaucratic hiring and
promotion systems to undermine cronyism (Dobbin et al. 1993), but the
courts proved unpredictable, vacillating on the legality of hiring quotas,
employment tests, and a variety of other measures. So variable was the
law that the Bureau of National Affairs published the Equal Employment
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Opportunity Manual in the form of a serial (Ropp 1987). Managers de-
vised an astonishing diversity of antidiscrimination practices—by the end
of the 1970s, Kenneth Marino found 33 new practices in wide use (1980).
The continuing ambiguity of compliance standards led management
writers to advocate permanent antidiscrimination ofﬁces to track legal
shifts. Because the courts were so ﬁckle, Marino (1980, p. 25) advised
executives to adopt the “Good-Faith-Effort Strategy,” the heart of which
was a special ofﬁce designed to signal that the employer was making every
effort to ﬁgure out how to comply. In a Harvard Business Review article,
Antonia Chayes (1974, p. 81) noted that “vigorous enforcement” had
brought “serious top management attention to antidiscrimination legisla-
tion. . . . Now the penalties imposed under employment discrimination
laws are seen as posing a severe ﬁnancial threat.” She advised executives
to set up EEO and AA programs that could prevent lawsuits. Meanwhile,
compensation of upper managers was being tied to afﬁrmative action per-
formance, and this led them to support dedicated antidiscrimination de-
partments (Vernon-Gerstenfeld and Burke 1985, pp. 59–60; Johns and
Moser 1989; Ropp 1987).
Indeﬁnite safety and health regulations.—The OccupationalSafety and
Health Act of 1970 represented a revolution of sorts, for it required all
employers to take steps to prevent illness and injury rather than merely
making restitution after the fact through Workmen’s Compensation. The
act created the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA),
with the power to codify safety and health regulations as they emerged
in legislation, case law, and administrative law. It gave states the option
of using OSHA inspectors or state safety inspectors to monitor workplaces
and respond to complaints (Bardach and Kagan 1982, p. 46).
Administrative health and safety guidelines outlawed speciﬁc work-
place conditions in excruciating detail rather than prescribing how to pre-
vent those conditions, in part because the Constitution checked Con-
gress’s capacity to dictate to private enterprises. OSHA wrote countless
guidelines that made particular conditions illegal but left local safety engi-
neers to ﬁgure out how to comply. In the case of health hazards, OSHA
established guidelines for exposure to hundreds of toxins. It speciﬁed ac-
ceptable levels of asbestos particulates, for instance, without dictating
how factories should achieve those levels—whether by changing produc-
tion techniques, installing ﬁlters, or automating work. In the case of safety
hazards, OSHA established broad guidelines and encouraged plant-
speciﬁc solutions. Guides to compliance, such as Richard Anderson’s
(1975) OSHA and Accident Control through Training, suggested that em-
ployers set up safety departments, training programs, safety committees,
grievance mechanisms, and “practice” federal safety inspections (Foulkes
and Morgan 1977; Ritter and Wagel 1989).
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As John Meyer and Brian Rowan argued, government safety controls
“make it important for organizations to create formal safety rules, safety
departments, and safety programs” to symbolize their commitment (1977,
p. 350). The personnel journals suggested that such ofﬁces served a public
relations function, contributing to “the appearance of social responsibility”
(Mendelhoff 1979, p. 92), and could help inoculate ﬁrms against damaging
legal judgments by signaling that the employer was making a “good faith
effort” to comply with complex and changing regulations (Anderson 1975;
Ewing 1983).
Ambiguity and complexity in beneﬁts regulation.—The Employee Re-
tirement Income Security Act (ERISA) of 1974 was designed to guarantee
that employers would make good on pension and beneﬁt promises. ERISA
also used tax incentives toencourage employers to offerbeneﬁts democrat-
ically, to all employees. It regulated not only common retirement schemes
but the whole range of employee beneﬁts (Gill 1985, pp. 2–8). The act
was a maze of esoteric legal language and was widely viewed as “the most
complex piece of legislation ever passed by Congress” (Tepper 1977, p.
105). It did not dictate a universal form for pensions or other beneﬁts, but
it regulated them in ﬁne detail. As amended through 1984, the act and its
Internal RevenueCode amendments ran to320 pages (Gill1985). For both
pension plans and beneﬁt plans, the act established (a) federal reporting
requirements, (b) requirements for disclosure to employees, (c) ﬁduciary
requirements, and (d) investment regulations. For pension plans, the act
also established (e) pension plan insurance, ( f) eligibility and participation
rules, (g) vesting guidelines, and (h) funding regulations (Coleman 1985).
Despite the tremendous complexity of the legislation, key stipulations
remained ambiguous. The act demanded that pension plan managers ex-
ercise “ﬁduciary responsibility” but offered neither a deﬁnition nor a lit-
mus test. As one primer on beneﬁt regulation warned: “no one knows what
the judicial interpretation” may be (Logue 1979, p. 65). The act required
that pensions be backed by certain levels of investment, without speci-
fying precisely how funds were to be invested. It gave employers three
different sets of pension vesting guidelines to choose from. Compliance
was not simply a matter of following a blueprint—it required accountants
and tax attorneys who could weigh a dizzying mix of options.
While compliance standards were complex and ambiguous, the costs
of noncompliance were high. Rather than requiring employers to comply,
as safety and health legislation did, the act created ﬁnancial incentives.
First, for complying plans, employer expenses are tax deductible, em-
ployer contributions are not taxed as current income to employees, and
earnings on invested funds are not taxed (Klein 1986, p. 72; Skolnik 1976).
Second, the act guaranteed pensions both through insurance and with the
assets of the employer, permitting employees to make claims not only
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against pension funds but also against employers. This meant that em-
ployers bore the risk of subscribing to poorly managed plans (Logue 1979,
p. 62; Wooten 1994).
Employers had to rewrite virtually all pension plans and many other
fringe beneﬁt plans to comply with the new regulations (Hakala and Hug-
gins 1976; Meyer and Fox 1974). One unanticipated consequence of the
act was that thousands of small companies chose to abandon their pension
plans rather than bear the costs of compliance (Davey 1978, p. 4; see also
Achenbaum 1986, p. 149; Logue 1979, p. 68). Most of the rest rewrote
their plans—at least 300,000 companies did so immediately (Klein and
Moses 1974).
The personnel journals counseled executives to consult tax lawyers and
accountants in writing plans and to establish departments to monitor
plans and prepare reports for the government. A new breed of “beneﬁts
consultants” emerged to argue that experts alone could devise schemes
that would guarantee tax deductions, fend off litigation, and minimize
employer outlays (Meyer and Fox 1974, p. 53; Meyer 1981).
The Expanding Scope of the Law
In each realm, the scope of the law was expanded frequently via new
legislation, administrative rulings, and case law. As a consequence, per-
sonnel specialists, antidiscrimination experts, safety engineers, and bene-
ﬁts accountants lobbied for special departments to track changes in the
law and create new compliance measures.
New classes of discrimination.—Congress ﬁrst expanded the scope of
the Civil Rights Act in 1967, adding employees over 40 to the list of pro-
tected groups (Farley 1979, p. 12). Following the Equal Employment Op-
portunity Act of 1972, which signaled that the EEOC would enforce EEO
law with vigor, Washington expanded the scope of the law often. In 1973,
Congress required federal contractors to extend afﬁrmative action to the
handicapped, and in 1974, it required them to include Vietnam-era veter-
ans (Pati and Adkins 1980).
Administrative and judicial rulings were responsible for much of the
growth in the law. For instance, neither sexual harassment nor maternity
leave were initially covered under sex discrimination law, but during the
1970s, both the EEOC and the courts came to treat harassment and re-
fusal to grant maternity leave as sex discrimination (Bradshaw 1987, p.
51). Sexual harassment guidelines illustrate how management specialists
responded. In 1980, the EEOC issued formal guidelines that read, “Ha-
rassment on the basis of sex is a violation of Section 703 of Title VII,”
but offered no hints about how to prevent harassment (quoted in Spann
1990, p. 58). Key management journals—Personnel, Public Personnel
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Management, the Harvard Business Review—warned of the potential for
litigation and advised managers to establish a “good faith effort” to pre-
vent harassment by creating training programs for supervisors, hiring om-
budspersons, establishing grievance mechanisms, and publishing guide-
lines (Spann 1990). They advised executives to establish equal
employment opportunity/afﬁrmative action (EEO/AA) ofﬁces to under-
take these measures.
OSHA’s growing list of dangers.—The scope of OSHA regulation ex-
panded dramatically as a result of administrative rulings. By the late
1970s, OSHA had developed standards for some 400 dangerous sub-
stances, covering the issues of air sampling, personal protection, handling
procedures, and medical exams (Northrup, Rowan, and Perry 1978, p.
49). As OSHA regulations grew, management writers implored ﬁrms to
hire safety specialists. In Regulating Safety, John Mendelhoff (1979) ar-
gued that OSHA regulations had become so complex that ﬁrms could not
depend on line managers for compliance. As early as 1978, a study of the
chemicals and aerospace industries found that the act had caused the typi-
cal ﬁrm tocreate a safety departmentor to enlarge theexisting department
(Northrup et al. 1978, p. 224).
It was the instability of the law that made a safety department impera-
tive. As Burton Malkiel argued in 1979 in the Harvard Business Review,
“changing health and safety regulations” undermine corporate planning:
“It is not so much the direct cost of regulation that has inhibited invest-
ment and R&D but rather the unpredictability of regulatory changes”
(1979, p. 90). Administrative and judicial decisions constantly altered the
rules of the game.
The expansion of beneﬁts regulation.—After 1974, Congress altered the
tax code and amended ERISA a number of times, complicating the matter
of compliance and expanding the scope of the law. Details of the tax treat-
ment of various retirement plans were amended in new tax code legisla-
tion in 1975, 1978, 1981, 1982, and 1984 (Coleman 1985, p. 10). Each
change required employers to review and rewrite their pension plans
(Meyer 1981; Bixby 1986). The biggest change to ERISA came in 1980,
when Congress expanded regulation of small employers, making those in
shared pension plans liable for up to 100% of their assets and spurring
even tiny ﬁrms to hire experts to manage pension programs (Figgie 1981).
The scope of ERISA coverage also grew for individual employers, as
they switched from one-size-ﬁts-all beneﬁts programs to myriad pension
and health insurance options and as they added such beneﬁts as perma-
nent disability insurance and on-site daycare. The management journals
advised ﬁrms to hire full-time specialists who could design beneﬁt plans
to comply with the law and to anticipate future legal changes. For in-
stance, as employers added 401k plans, beneﬁts accountants advised them
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to make low-wage workers eligible, so as to ensure tax-exempt status, and
to sell the plans to low-wage workers, in case the courts should decide
to treat plans that discriminate de facto as taxable (Moody and Higgins
1984).
The Fragmentation of Enforcement
Enforcement of these laws was carried out by autonomous federal agen-
cies with distinct charges. Management writers argued that all-purpose,
employment-law experts would not sufﬁce in America’s fragmented regu-
latory environment. A 1977 article in the Harvard Business Review ad-
vised: “The various requirements of state and federal regulations . . . make
increasing demands on both proﬁt and nonproﬁt organizations. . . . Com-
pliance with the laws relating to OSHA, EEOC, and ERISA demands
expertise” (Foulkes and Morgan, p. 160).
Interfacing with the EEOC and OFCCP.—The EEOC and OFCCP
were established as independent agencies to enforce EEO and AA law
respectively. While nothing in the law required employers to establish
antidiscrimination ofﬁces, from the early 1970s, the management journals
counseled them to do so in articles with titles such as “A Total Approach
to EEO Compliance” (Giblin and Ornati 1974, p. 37). Special ofﬁces could
create antidiscrimination programs to preclude litigation by the EEOC
and could deal with OFCCP demands for employment statistics, written
afﬁrmative action goals and timetables, and on-site “compliance reviews.”
Barbara Boyle (1973, pp. 88–89) wrote in the Harvard Business Review
that costly litigation made an autonomous antidiscrimination ofﬁce “at
the highest practicable level in the organization (i.e., outside the personnel
ofﬁce)” well worth the price: “The establishment of an afﬁrmative action
program is not costly—its absence is.” Antonia Chayes (1974) followed
with an article in the same journal, titled “Make Your EEO Program
Court-Proof,” that recommended naming an afﬁrmative action ofﬁcer at
a minimum. A 1974 article in Personnel suggested that the law provided
an opportunity to establish personnel departments and full-blown person-
nel systems: “Viewing the [antidiscrimination] guidelines in strictly nega-
tive terms, executives have failed to see that the government concern for
programs of EEO compliance actually provides the impetus for devel-
oping a personnel system” (Froehlich and Hawyer 1974, p. 62). Employers
respondedby creatingEEOand AAdepartments (GiblinandOrnati 1974,
p. 45; Johns and Moser 1989, p. 56).
Interfacing with OSHA.—OSHA’s powers extended beyond data col-
lection and litigation to inspection of workplaces. The threat of inspection
loomed large because OSHA regulations were already daunting and were
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proliferating quickly. As Herbert Froelich and Dennis Hawyer counseled
in the journal Personnel in 1974 (p. 67): “Some years ago, a vice-president
of General Motors said that ‘safety is good business.’ He may not have
anticipated thetough regulatorycrackdownof OSHA, butthere is aparal-
lel in the current government regulations: Compliance is good business.”
Compliance manuals suggested that employers have safety experts on
hand: “An excellent person to guide the [OSHA] inspector would be the
safety manager or safety engineer” (Anderson 1975, p. 243). The engineer
might direct the inspector’s attention to major safety innovations and
away from minor technical violations (Rees 1988, p. 53). Rees found that
by the mid-1980s, executives had hired safety experts with the speciﬁc
goals of tracking case law and educating OSHA inspectors (1988, p. 52).
From the early 1970s, engineering journals, personnel journals, and
management treatises advised that safety experts could now win perma-
nent positions and even their own departments. The authors of a study
conducted in the mid-1970s concluded: “There was general agreement
among safety personnel in a broad range of ﬁrms that the passage of the
Act had served to increase their own status and credibility and that of
their function within the company” (Northrup et al. 1978, p. 224). The
act had boosted the importance of safety units: “The net effect has been
a substantial increase in the status of health and safety personnel. . . .
They are regarded as necessary defenders against costly and embarrassing
mistakes that threaten corporate viability” (Northrup et al. 1978, p. 49)
Interfacing with the IRS and the PBGC.—Enforcement of ERISA was
divided between the Treasury Department’s Internal Revenue Service
(IRS), which held the authority for tax disqualiﬁcation and which gov-
erned most funding issues, and the Labor Department’s Pension Beneﬁt
Guarantee Corporation (PBGC), which governed ﬁduciary issues and
handled reporting and disclosure. The PBGC demanded a range of differ-
ent reports from employers, including an annual disclosure statement for
each employee (Klein 1986; Coleman 1985, p. 7).
Writers in insurance and management journals argued that the paper-
work alone augured well for the creation of personnel and beneﬁts
ofﬁces. ERISA and Social Security changes, a 1980 article in Personnel
concluded, had boosted executive support: “Personnel activities in many
organizations are becoming increasingly important—largely because of
the high cost of labor and beneﬁts [and] the negative impact of govern-
ment regulations” (Zippo 1980, p. 66). As a 1977 article in the Harvard
Business Review concluded, “Personnel must have the ability to under-
stand the needs both of the line organization and of the various branches
of state and federal government. . . . We suggest that a team be developed”
that includes specialists in beneﬁts and in the law (Foulkes and Morgan
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1977, p. 162). By failing to adhere to ERISA’s complex pension guidelines,
the journals pointed out, employers risked losing tax deductions for contri-
butions, having their plans terminated by the PBGC, and being sued by
current and former employees. The journals advised ﬁrms to hire beneﬁts
experts with accounting and legal backgrounds who could document com-
pliance and make sense of emerging legal standards.
In sum, in each realm, new employment laws were ambiguous and com-
plex, were subject to frequent expansion, and were enforced by distinct
federal agencies. We hypothesize that executives responded to these laws
by creating specialized departments. The journals advised employers to
establish personnel ofﬁces as a ﬁrst step, thus, we expect personnel ofﬁces
to rise from the time of the ﬁrst legislative change.
Hypothesis 1.—The Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, cou-
pled with the OFCCP’s Revised Order 4 from late 1971, caused the adop-
tion of EEO/AA ofﬁces to rise from 1972.
Hypothesis 2.—Passage of the Occupational Safety and Health Act
caused the adoption of health and safety ofﬁces to rise from 1970.
Hypothesis 3.—The Pension Reform Act caused the adoption of bene-
ﬁts ofﬁces to rise from 1974.
Hypothesis 4.—Equal employment, safety and health, and pension re-
form legislation caused the adoption of personnel ofﬁces to rise from 1970,
when the ﬁrst legislative landmark occurred.
We argue that public accountability and age should mediate the effects
of legal shifts.
Public accountability and the symbolization of justice.—W. Richard
Scottand JohnMeyer(1987) arguethat publicand nonproﬁt organizations
are ﬁrst to embrace new norms because they are judged more by their
activities than by their performance. Marshall Meyer (1979, p. 285) adds
that public organizations can more readily pass on the costs of new struc-
tures. We expect that public and nonproﬁt organizations will be more
likely to install new ofﬁces despite the fact that government ofﬁces were
exempt from many of these regulations.
Hypothesis 5.—Public and nonproﬁt organizations adopted new
rights-related ofﬁces more readily than did private organizations.
Organizational age and institutionalization.—Stinchcombe (1965) ar-
gues that managers adopt the organizational structures prevalent at the
time of the industry’s birth. New organizations and industries are most
likely to have the latest practices as a consequence. Studies have con-
ﬁrmed this and have shown that older organizations are more highly insti-
tutionalized in Selznick’s (1949) sense: they are resistant to change.
Hypothesis 6.—Older organizations were less likely to adopt each type
of ofﬁce.
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Antistatist Elements and the Reconstruction of Ofﬁces
as Efﬁciency Centers
Middle managers initially promoted equal employment, health and safety,
and beneﬁts departments to manage legal compliance. During the late
1970s and early 1980s, however, they reconstructed these departments as
components of human resources management and articulated theories of
how each contributed to productive efﬁciency. Managers did this, we ar-
gue, because theConstitution paintsstate domination of private enterprise
as illicit. By the time the Reagan administration cut enforcement in these
three realms, the new justiﬁcations had succeeded so well that employers
continued to create new departments.
Here our predictions contrast sharply with those of legal analysts who
note that Reagan cut federal regulation with much fanfare and who thus
predict a weakening of organizational compliance. Students of law and
regulation, discussed below, suggest that compliance efforts will be pro-
portional to the threat of regulatory sanction. Rather than declining in
popularity during the early 1980s, we expect these ofﬁces to increase in
popularity.
The reconstruction of the EEO/AA ofﬁce as the “diversity” center.—
The renovation of antidiscrimination ofﬁces as efﬁciency centers began
almost immediately. First, personnel specialists argued that formal hiring
and promotion rules inspired by EEO law would not only help employers
ﬁght discrimination suits but would help them to rationalize the place-
ment of employees. As early as 1974, Froelich and Hawyer (pp. 62–63)
argued inPersonnel that equalemployment opportunity lawhad spawned
performance-based personnel systems, which should be “as much a com-
ponent of sound business planning as ﬁnancial, manufacturing, and mar-
ket planning are.” By 1979, a Wall Street Journal poll of top executives
found that nearly two-thirds favored government programs to increase
hiring of women and minorities (Harvard Law Review 1989, p. 661). Early
in the 1980s, management specialists described afﬁrmative action prac-
tices as an “essential management tool which reinforces accountability
and maximizes the utilization of the talents of [the] entire work force”
(Feild 1984, p. 17). When Reagan sought to end enforcement, he encoun-
tered substantial opposition from business leaders on just these grounds
(Harvard Law Review 1989).
Second, personnel specialists came to argue that diversity in the work-
place increases efﬁciency in and of itself. From the late 1970s, manage-
ment consultants extolled the secondary beneﬁts of workforce diversity.
“Leading consultants, academics and business leaders . . . point out that
a well managed, diverse workforce holds potential competitive advan-
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tages for organizations” (Cox and Blake 1991, p. 45). In human resources
parlance, “diversity” came to replace “afﬁrmative action” as the code word
for efforts to integrate the workforce. Proponents argued that diversity
offers design, production, and marketing advantages because it brings
people with varied skills and backgrounds together. In 1986, the National
Association of Manufacturers described afﬁrmative action as a “business
policy which has allowed industry to beneﬁt from new ideas, opinions and
perspectives generated by greater workforce diversity” (quoted in Har-
vard Law Review 1989, p. 669; see also Bureau of National Affairs 1986,
p. 93). We expect, following Edelman (1992), that despite Reagan’s cuts
in EEOC enforcement, diffusion of personneland EEO/AAofﬁces contin-
ued apace.
The reconstruction of health and safety as HRM and publicity func-
tions.—Middle managers transformed OSHA-inspired safety programs
into efﬁciency measures in three ways. First, they argued that new safety
initiatives demonstrated the ﬁrm’s commitment to employees, the key to
winning employee commitment to the ﬁrm according to the HRM para-
digm. As a popular HRM text suggested as early as 1977: “A manager
can use health and safety to motivate workers” by decreasing “the sense
of alienation” and increasing “identiﬁcation with the organization’s pur-
poses” (Burack and Smith 1977, p. 419).
Second, during the 1970s and 1980s, executive remuneration came to
be linked to stock price, causing top managers to become acutely sensitive
to negative publicity. In 1983, Robert Jackall reported in the Harvard
Business Review that executives believed that “the bad publicity from
one serious accident in the workplace can jeopardize years of work and
scores of safety awards.” In the words of one high-ranking chemical com-
pany executive: “In the corporate world, 1,000 ‘Attaboys!’ are wiped away
by one ‘Oh, shit!’” (Jackall 1983, p. 128). Engineers thus sold health and
safety departments to executives to prevent accidents that bring negative
publicity, threatening stock price, market share, and executive compensa-
tion.
Third, managers argued that new safety technologies spurred them to
replace antiquated production facilities and gave them a ﬁrst-mover ad-
vantage in a global economy with a growing market for safe and environ-
mentally sound technologies. The response to OSHA’s 1978 lowering of
the permissible level of airborne cotton dust illustrates this point. The
textile industry fought cotton dust controls designed to end brown lung
disease, but the Supreme Court eventually upheld OSHA’s ruling. Mean-
while, managers at one company automated cotton manufacture to reduce
cotton dust exposure. They sold the changes to executives by documenting
productivity gains, arguing that “OSHA’s regulation on cotton dust has
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been the main factor in forcing technological innovation in a centuries-
old and somewhat stagnant industry” (Jackall 1983, p. 50).
The reconstruction of beneﬁts as the new corporate “welfare work.”—
In the 1920s, many employers joined the “welfare work” bandwagon, con-
vinced by arguments that generous fringe beneﬁts could win employee
commitment and undermine unionism (Brandes 1976). From the late
1970s, parallel arguments for corporate welfarism were proffered by bene-
ﬁts and management specialists. First, they argued that the key to winning
employee commitment and solving recruitment and retention problems
was to display the employer’s commitment to the employee with pension,
health, training, and family programs. Second, they advised that well-
conceived beneﬁt plans benchmarked to those of competitors could stem
union efforts (Foulkes 1980, p. 227).
Experts clothed the new welfarism in the rhetoric of modern manage-
ment, emphasizing the importance of strategic planning and integration
with other management functions. One beneﬁts textbook marveled that,
“prior to the early 1980s, strategic planning [of compensation and beneﬁts]
was rare” (McCaffery 1986, p. 18). Robert Greene and Russell Roberts
wrote in 1983 that sophisticated beneﬁts packages should take employer
resources into account, with an eye to “what will be required to meet the
strategic goals of the organization” (p. 82). In Fred Foulkes’s (1980) study
of personnel and beneﬁts systems, managers cited competitive advantage
in the labor market, not legal compliance, as the key function of beneﬁts
departments. Consultants argued that a professional department charged
with maximizing beneﬁts while minimizing cost can save the employer
huge sums on turnover costs, antiunion efforts, and beneﬁts packages
themselves.
We expect that despite cutbacks in federal enforcement in these three
realms during the Reagan administration, which we detail below, the re-
construction of new departments in efﬁciency terms caused them to dif-
fuse even after 1980.
Hypothesis 7.—Despite the reduction in enforcement after 1980, the
reconstruction of EEO/AA, health and safety, and beneﬁts ofﬁces in efﬁ-
ciency terms caused adoption to remain high. Despite the reduction in
enforcement, the rise of the human resources management paradigm
caused adoption of personnel/HRM ofﬁces to remain high.
The Stages-of-Institutionalization Thesis
The reconstruction of policy-induced structures as efﬁcient should not
only cause diffusion to continue after the Reagan administration cut en-
forcement but should produce the pattern that Tolbert and Zucker (1983)
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discovered in the case of early civil service reforms. First, the structure is
prescribed as a solution to a particular problem, whether it be a functional
problem (e.g., hazardous work) or a problem of legal compliance. Next,
the structure is prescribed as part of accepted management practice; “The
legitimacy of the procedures themselves serves as the impetus for the late
adopters” (Tolbert and Zucker 1983, p. 35). In consequence, the organiza-
tional factors that predict early adoption do not predict late adoption. We
expect to ﬁnd that the organizational characteristics that predict adoption
of personnel, beneﬁts, health and safety, and antidiscrimination ofﬁces
will decline in importance over time, as these ofﬁces are transformed from
compliance centers into productivity centers.
Hypothesis 8.—The institutionalization of personnel, EEO/AA,
health and safety, and beneﬁts units caused characteristics predicting
adoption to decline in importance over time.
Professionals as Agents of Diffusion
Professional groups theorized the importance of these ofﬁces (Strang and
Meyer 1994; Sutton and Dobbin 1996). Three groups were particularly
important: personnel professionals, labor relations specialists, and law-
yers. We argue that even loose links to such professionals should affect
adoption of ofﬁces.
Personnel, labor relations, and legal ofﬁces.—A personnel ofﬁce is
frequently the ﬁrst line of defense executives establish against employ-
ment litigation. While the personnel journals frequently advocated
the creation of separate EEO, health and safety, and beneﬁts ofﬁces as
further defenses, previous studies have shown that when other factors
are controlled, personnel ofﬁces are negatively associated with the crea-
tion of antidiscrimination ofﬁces (Dobbin et al. 1988; Edelman 1992).
Personnel managers apparently prefer to take on new functions them-
selves.
Hypothesis 9.—Organizations with personnel ofﬁces were less likely
than others to adopt beneﬁts, health and safety, and EEO/AA ofﬁces after
legal landmarks.
Labor relations specialists, by contrast, make organizations sensitive to
employment law but do not compete for resources with antidiscrimina-
tion, beneﬁts, or health and safety ofﬁces. We expect that the presence of
a labor relations unit will have a positive effect on these ofﬁces.
Hypothesis 10.—Organizations with labor relations ofﬁces were more
likely to adopt beneﬁts, health and safety, and EEO/AA ofﬁces after legal
landmarks.
Legal ofﬁces also make organizations sensitive to employment law (Sut-
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ton and Dobbin 1996), and like labor relations ofﬁces, they do not compete
with the other ofﬁces.
Hypothesis 11.—Organizations with legal ofﬁces were more likely to
adopt beneﬁts, health and safety, and EEO/AA ofﬁces after legal land-
marks.
Weaker links to the personnel and legal professionals.—As we have
seen, the journals of personnel associations, such as Personnel and Person-
nel Journal, actively promoted the creation of new personnel, equal em-
ployment, beneﬁts, and health and safety positions. Other studies have
found that personnel association membership increases the likelihood that
an organization will adopt legal compliance measures (Dobbin et al. 1993).
We expect this to hold true for HRM divisions.
Hypothesis 12.—Membership in a personnel association encouraged
adoption of personnel, beneﬁts, health and safety, and EEO/AA ofﬁces
after legal landmarks.
Links to labor and employment-law attorneys should have a particu-
larly strong effect on the creation of compliance departments. We asked
employers when, if ever, they kept a labor or employment-law attorney
on retainer.
Hypothesis 13.—Organizations keeping a labor or employment-law at-
torney on retainer were more likely to create personnel, beneﬁts, health
and safety, and EEO/AA ofﬁces after legal landmarks.
Labor Relations Law
We have argued that several ofﬁces were popularized by the rights revolu-
tion of the early 1970s. But it is also possible that personnel-related ofﬁces
diffused as part of a secular trend. To rule this out, we analyze labor
relations ofﬁces. Between 1955 and 1985, there were no major legal re-
forms that might have increased their popularity. The most important
federal legislation, the Landrum-Grifﬁn Act of 1959, regulated union ﬁ-
nances and strike activity rather than expanding union rights. The most
important state legislation, “right to work” laws adopted by 20 states by
the end of the 1970s, actually curtailed union rights.
Hypothesis 14.—In the absence of landmark labor legislation, the
adoption of labor relations departments did not rise signiﬁcantly during
the 1970s.
Two important changes in labor relations did occur, however. First,
there was a general decline in unionization. Because this change occurred
largely through the founding of nonunion ﬁrms in new industries, we do
not expect to ﬁnd that employers closed existing labor relations ofﬁces.
Second, unionization grew among white collar employees in the govern-
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ment and nonproﬁt sectors during the 1970s. We expect that this helped
to institutionalizelabor relations ofﬁces.Thus, we expectto see anincrease
in labor relations departments in those sectors, even statistically control-
ling for whether the employer is unionized in the current year.
Hypothesis 15.—Due to growing government and nonproﬁt unioniza-
tion, the adoption of labor relations departments rose in those sectors dur-
ing the 1970s.
Next, we review competing theories of ofﬁce creation, which point to
scale economies, unionism, transaction costs or labor segmentation, and
regulatory effort. In the section that follows, we explore hypotheses with
event-history analyses of data collected from 279 organizations for the
period 1955–85.
ALTERNATIVE THEORIES OF OFFICE CREATION
Several theories offer hypotheses about where and when personnel, bene-
ﬁts, health and safety, equal employment, and labor relations ofﬁces will
appear.
Scale Economies
In “A Formal Theory of Differentiation in Organizations,” Peter Blau
(1970) argues that increases in scale are accompanied by the proliferation
of subunits. Blau sees increases in size leading to specialization within the
organization,as in AdamSmith’s celebratedpin factory, andconsequently
to differentiation. Blau implies that personnel administration will be dif-
ferentiated from general management once the organization reaches a cer-
tain size and that functions such as beneﬁts administration will be differ-
entiated once the organization reaches another threshold (see also Blau
and Schoenherr 1971). Empirical studies have shown a declining effect of
size, represented by a logged measure.
Hypothesis 16.—Large organizations were more likely to install all
ﬁve types of ofﬁces.
Unionism
Safety and fringe beneﬁts are two of the pillars of union politics in the
United States.Early studies of personnel practice show that unions caused
employers to create new ofﬁces to deal with these issues (National Indus-
trial Conference Board 1940). More generally, from the time of the
Wagner Act, unionized ﬁrms have installed both personnel and labor rela-
tions departments to stem the growing power of unions (Jacoby 1985).
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Hypothesis 17.—Unionized organizations were more likely to adopt
health and safety, beneﬁts, personnel, and labor relations ofﬁces.
Transaction Costs and Labor Segmentation Theories
Transaction costs and labor segmentation theorists ﬁnd that ﬁrms in core,
capital-intensive sectors go to great lengths to secure long-term employ-
ment (Williamson 1975; Gordon, Edwards, and Reich 1982; see also Doer-
inger and Piore 1971). They use internal promotion systems, seniority
rules, and beneﬁtslinked to job tenure, establishing personnel and beneﬁts
ofﬁces to administer these programs. They establish labor relations ofﬁces
to handle unions (Jacoby 1985). They should also create safety ofﬁces to
prevent accidents and equal employment ofﬁces to prevent disaffection
of women and minorities. Among the 13 sectors in our sample, chemicals
and electrical manufacturing are most easily classiﬁed as core. Machinery
is a mixed bag, containing core ﬁrms and small machine shops (Gordon
et al. 1992, pp. 199–201), but our sample probably contains few machine
shops because it is limited to ﬁrms with at least 50 employees and $500,000
in assets as of 1985. As early as the 1940s, a similar sample of machinery
ﬁrms showed a high incidence of personnel departments (Baron et al.
1986).
Hypothesis 18.—Organizations in the chemicals, machinery, and elec-
trical industries were more likely to adopt all ﬁve kinds of ofﬁces.
Regulatory Effort
Students of law and regulation from both left and right agree that active
enforcement and the threat of sanctions increase corporate compliance
activities (Sunstein 1996; Posner 1997). Enforcement of employment law
was most active during the 1970s. Ronald Reagan ran for president on a
promise to reduce federal regulation of business and made good on that
promise soon after taking ofﬁce in 1981. Reagan ofﬁcials directed the
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) to curtail litigation
and loosen standards and halved stafﬁng at afﬁrmative action’s oversight
agency, the OFCCP (Edelman 1992, p. 1541; Skrentny 1996; DuRivage
1985, p. 364). Reagan cut PBGC and Department of Labor enforcement of
the Pension Reform Act, and, by cutting antitrust enforcement, he enabled
ﬁrms to acquire others for the purpose of raiding their pension schemes
(Achenbaum 1986, pp. 155–56). Reagan directed OSHA to curtail inspec-
tion of workplaces, to halt ongoing litigation against employers, and to
reduce the number of regulated toxins (Jackall 1983; Ewing 1983; Hart-
nett 1996). Perhaps most important, Reagan’s judicial and quasi-judicial
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appointees opposed workplace regulation and thus weakened enforce-
ment efforts.
Hypothesis 19.—Employers were more likely to adopt EEO/AA, bene-
ﬁts, health and safety, and personnel ofﬁces in the 1970s when regulatory
efforts were greatest, and they were less likely to adopt these ofﬁces from
1981, when regulatory efforts declined.
DATA AND METHODS
In the previous section, we chronicled the history of policy in three realms
to show that the federal government’s policy style produced a similar
chain of events in each. New policies generated specialty compliance de-
partments. Antistatist sentiments led incumbents in those departments to
develop efﬁciency justiﬁcations for their existence. In consequence, the
withdrawal of federal enforcement did not stall the diffusion of those de-
partments. And because those departments had been theorized as enhanc-
ing efﬁciencyin general, thefactors associated with earlyadoption became
less important over time. Next we test these claims with data from several
hundred employers.
The Sample
We selected a stratiﬁed random sample of public, for-proﬁt, and nonproﬁt
organizations in 1985, collecting retrospective data from 279 organiza-
tions. We generated the sample in three states with different legal environ-
ments: California, New Jersey, and Virginia (Sutton et al. 1994). We sam-
pled from 13 diverse sectors to make tests of sector effects possible.
The difﬁculties associated with sampling organizations have been well
documented (Kalleberg et al. 1990). We sampled randomly from the best
published list of organizations available for each sector. For ﬁrms in bank-
ing, chemicals, electrical manufacturing, machinery, retail trade, and
transportation, we went to Dun’s Million Dollar Directory, which lists all
publicly traded ﬁrms with assets of $500,000. We sampled hospitals from
the directory of the American Hospital Association (1983) and nonproﬁts
from the Encyclopedia of Associations (Akey 1984). For public organiza-
tions, we used state and federal agency directories and telephone directo-
ries to sample equal numbers of city, county, state, and federal employers.
Before identifying a ﬁnal sample, we contacted employers to ensure that
they were located in one of the three states, operated in one of the 13
sectors, and employed at least 50 persons.
Response rate.—We contacted 620 organizations and received com-
pleted questionnaires from exactly 300, for a response rate of 48%. After
follow-up telephone calls to ﬁll in missing data, we excluded 21 organiza-
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tions due to poor data quality. This brought the survey completion rate
down to 45%, which compares favorably with other organizational stud-
ies: Blau and colleagues (1976) completed 36%, Lincoln and Kalleberg
(1985) completed 35%, and Edelman (1992) completed 54% in a telephone
interview. The sample may suffer from selection bias, because organiza-
tions with personnel ofﬁces were probably more likely to respond. How-
ever, the over-time framework minimizes the problem by ensuring many
cases (annual organizational spells) without personnel departments, par-
ticularly in the early years.
Measurement
Dependent variables.—We examine the creation of ﬁve structures:
personnel/HRM, beneﬁts, health and safety, EEO/AA, and labor rela-
tions. We do not distinguish between personnel and HRM departments,
because they are functional equivalents. In the cases of personnel/HRM,
beneﬁts, health and safety, and labor relations, we analyze the establish-
ment of ofﬁces.
In the case of EEO/AA, we analyze creation of either an ofﬁce or an
ofﬁcer for several reasons. First, management journals often advocated
afﬁrmative action “ofﬁcers”; whereas, they advocated beneﬁts and health/
safety “ofﬁces” or “departments” (see Chayes 1974). Second, Edelman
(1992) found that the average size of corporate afﬁrmative action ofﬁces
was less than two employees. Thus, the difference between an “ofﬁce” and
an “ofﬁcer” is often semantic—either may involve a single expert. Third,
because the average afﬁrmative action ofﬁce in a public agency has over
seven employees (see Edelman 1992), we found that public employers tend
to use “ofﬁce” and private employers tend to use “ofﬁcer.”
Our data cover 1955–85. For EEO/AA ofﬁce or ofﬁcer, we begin the
analysis in 1961, the year in which John Kennedy required “afﬁrmative
action.” Forother ofﬁces,which existed insome organizationsbefore 1955,
we begin the analysis in that year. For all outcomes, organizations born
after 1955 enter the risk set upon birth. Organizations that abandon a
particular ofﬁce reenter the risk set. None of these ofﬁces was abandoned
by more than a handful of employers.
Independent variables.—Table 1 lists the independent variables. All
vary over time. We expect the Occupational Safety and Health Act of
1970, the Pension Reform Act of 1974, and the EEO Act of 1972 to in-
crease the adoption of related departments. We expect these three changes
to affect personnel/HRM departments from 1970, and we examine
whether the diffusion of labor relations ofﬁces rises in the same year.
For each department, we start the third time period in 1981 to examine
whether Reagan’s cuts in enforcement stalled diffusion. If we are correct
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TABLE 1
Variable List
Variable Deﬁnition
Log employment ..................... Natural logarithm of number of employees
Union ....................................... Presence of a union contract
Personnel/HRM ofﬁce ............ Presence of a personnel or human resources manage-
ment ofﬁce
Labor relations ofﬁce ............. Presence of a labor relations ofﬁce
Personnel association ............. Member of a personnel association
Age of organization ................ Age of organization in years
Periods ..................................... Periods of relevant policy regimes (see text)
Legal ofﬁce .............................. Presence of a legal ofﬁce
Labor attorney on retainer .... Organization has a labor/employment attorney on re-
tainer
Sectors:*
Electrical and machinery
Chemicals
Local government ............... Includes local and county
State and federal
Nonproﬁt
Note.—All variables are measured at the start of the year. All vary over time.
* Omitted categories: printing, transportation, trade, banking, hospitals.
in arguing that these ofﬁces had been justiﬁed in purely economic terms,
the rate of adoption should not decline.
We include binary variables representing each of the sectors of theoreti-
cal interest. To operationalize transaction costs and labor segmentation
theories, we include capital intensive industries with ﬁrm-speciﬁc skills:
chemicals, machinery, and electrical machinery. To operationalize institu-
tional arguments about public accountability, we include public and non-
proﬁt sectors. To operationalize the argument that public and nonproﬁt
unionization drives of the 1970s popularized labor relations ofﬁces there,
we look at industry by period effects. With unionization controlled, public
and nonproﬁt status should have positive effects in 1971–80. The omitted
sectors are printing, transportation, trade, banking, and hospitals.
The Time Trend
Figures 1 and 2 show striking increases in the popularity of all ofﬁces
but labor relations. Between 1955 and 1985, the prevalence of personnel,
beneﬁts, and health and safety ofﬁces more than doubled, with the largest
gains coming after new federal employment rights were created in the
early 1970s. The ﬁrst EEO/AA ofﬁces and ofﬁcers appeared in 1968, and,
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by 1985, fully 40% of employers had them. While we can only make tenta-
tive inferences from the raw plots, they appear to support our argument
about the rights revolution. For personnel, beneﬁts, health and safety, and
EEO/AA units, the slopes change notably at the end of the 1960s. For
each of these, the slope does not decline after 1980, when regulatory effort
declined.
Estimation
Table 2 presents piecewise exponential models, estimated with maximum
likelihood techniques using Nancy Tuma’s (1979) RATE program. Over
the 30-year time frame we cover, the 279 organizations yield 6,701 annual
spells of observation (organization-years). Organizations are excluded
from the risk set before their birth and after they have adopted a practice,
thus, those that had the modeled unit in 1955 are left-censored. The num-
ber of at-risk spells ranges from 3,506 to 5,779, and the number of transi-
tions ranges from 41 to 146.
Piecewise exponential models allow us to present a vector of variables
hypothesized to have stable effects over time, constants for each time pe-
riod to pick up changes in the legal environment, and interactions between
time periods and other variables. To evaluate period effects, we con-
strained the coefﬁcient for the constant in period 1 to equal zero.
FINDINGS
In table 2 we present one equation for each of the outcomes of interest.
For comparability, we present parallel models for each of the outcomes,
varying only the relevant time periods. For simplicity, we include vari-
ables that showed consistent effects across periods in the ﬁrst, cross-
period, vector. We include variables that showed inconsistent effects
across periods for any outcome in the time-dependent vectors.
Legal Landmarks of the 1970s
The legal changes of the early 1970s had marked effects on employers. For
personnel, beneﬁts, and EEO/AA units, the second period, representing a
legal landmark, shows a signiﬁcant positive coefﬁcient. Additional sup-
port for the role of regulation is found in our analysis of labor relations
ofﬁces. Was the creation of new ofﬁces simply part of a secular trend
toward differentiation? There were no regulatory landmarks that might
have spawned labor relations ofﬁces, and as we predicted, there is no
evidence of a general rise.
466Strength of a Weak State
Regulatory Effort versus the Reconstruction of Departments
as Efﬁcient
The Reagan era shows a signiﬁcant positive effect. Comparisons of con-
stant terms for periods 2 and 3 show that the diffusion of personnel, bene-
ﬁts, health and safety, and EEO/AA ofﬁces did not slow after 1980. For
three of the ofﬁces, adoption rose in the 1970s and continued at about the
same rate (net of the effects of covariates) after 1980. Adoption of health
and safety ofﬁces rose only after 1980. These ﬁndings show that the weak-
ening of regulation during the Reagan years did not slow adoption, as the
regulatory effort hypothesis predicts. They support our argument that
these ofﬁces had been successfully retheorized in terms of efﬁciency. We
ﬁnd not simply that existing ofﬁces survived the ﬁrst Reagan term but
that ofﬁces continued to be established apace.
Efﬁciency Rationales and the Declining Importance of Covariates
Further evidence that these ofﬁces had been retheorized in efﬁciency
terms comes from changes in the effects of covariates. Among the four
structures stimulated by the rights revolution, there is a decline over time
in the importance of functional needs and susceptibility to the law. In the
ﬁrst period, before legal landmarks, a total of 15 coefﬁcients for covariates
are statistically signiﬁcant. In the second period, a total of six are signiﬁ-
cant. In the third period, only one is signiﬁcant. As these departments
were reconstructed in terms of their generic efﬁciency, organizations of
all sorts adopted them.
Middle Managers as Purveyors
We argued that professional groups promoted new ofﬁces. Having a legal
ofﬁce increases the chance of creating each structure in the ﬁrst period and
two of them in the secondperiod. Having a labor/employment attorney on
retainer shows generally positive effects. Having a labor relations ofﬁce
increases the chance of adopting beneﬁts and health and safety ofﬁces,
and this effect does not vary over time. Previous studies suggested that
personnel managers oppose the creation of competing departments, yet
above, we presented evidence that their associations promoted new posi-
tions to handle EEO, health and safety, and beneﬁts. Accordingly, in table
2, we show that employers that belong to personnel associations are more
likely to create beneﬁts and EEO/AA units but that employers with per-
sonnel departments are no more likely to create EEO/AA and safety units
and are less likely to create beneﬁts units.
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Age and Public Accountability
Other institutional hypothesesfare well.Older organizationsare less likely
to create personnel/HRM, beneﬁts, and health and safety ofﬁces, as the
Stinchcombe/Selznick hypothesis suggests. Public and nonproﬁt employ-
ers are more likely to adopt these same three ofﬁces before legal shifts,
which suggests that they are most likely to anticipate new legal norms.
After legal landmarks, public and nonproﬁt employers remain more likely
to adopt personnel, health and safety, and EEO/AA units.
Scale Economies, Unionism, Transaction Costs, and Segmentation
The other theories show mixed results. Size, measured as log employment,
shows robust effects on all ﬁve outcomes, lending support to functional
arguments. The union drive of the 1970s increases labor relations ofﬁces
among public and nonproﬁt employers, even with current union status in
the equation. This can be seen in the period 2 effects of local government,
state and federal government, and nonproﬁts on labor relations ofﬁces.
The strength of these sector effects, even with establishment unionization
controlled, suggests that it was not the signing of a union contract that
produced new ofﬁces but wider union gains. It appears that the growth
of labor relations in the 1970s, evident in ﬁgure 2, is a consequence of
union gains among public and nonproﬁt employers alone, because the con-
stant term for period 2 shows no effect.
Transaction costs and labor segmentation theories gain some support
here. In the ﬁrst period, before legal landmarks, ﬁrms in capital intensive
industries that depend on ﬁrm-speciﬁc skills—electrical manufacturing,
machinery, and chemicals—are more likely to install beneﬁts, health and
safety, and EEO/AA structures. This effect declines over time, however,
as predicted.
CONCLUSION
The federal employment rights revolution of the early 1970s was designed
to expand rights to equal protection, life and liberty, and social citizenship
in the workplace. We have argued that the ambiguity of compliance stan-
dards, expanding scope of the law, and fragmentation of administration
led organizations to establish specialty departments to signal a commit-
ment to compliance, to import and invent compliance strategies, and to
handle federal regulators. Organizations created new ofﬁces not because
the law dictated that they do so but because the law did not tell them
what to do. Management journals deﬁned specialized ofﬁces, with expert
staffs, as the best protection against costly lawsuits. Our analyses show
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that shortly after each legal landmark, employers began to create new
ofﬁces to handle compliance.
The strength of the weak U.S. state is evident in what happened next.
Justiﬁcations for these ofﬁces drifted away from compliance and toward
pure efﬁciency. By 1980, managers were advocating each kind of ofﬁce
in the rational language offered by the new human resources management
paradigm. We argue that this occurred in part because constitutional pro-
tectionsagainst therise offederal tyranny signal that governmentdomina-
tion of private enterprise is inefﬁcient and illicit. It occurred in part be-
cause the law gave employers a particularly active role in devising
compliance mechanisms, and hence, middle managers came to see those
mechanisms as their own. And it occurred in part because ambiguous
federal mandates are a thin reed on which to build elaborate new person-
nel programs.
It is not that managers deny that the law affects them. It is, rather, that
they develop efﬁciency rationales for the ofﬁces they establish in response
to the law. By the early 1980s, the new human resources management
movement was championing diversity as the key to expanding markets
and improving innovation, safety and health programs as the key to win-
ning employee commitment and renovating antiquated technologies, and
beneﬁts programs as a means to reducing alienation and improving
worker attitudes.
Our data show dramatic effects of this retheorization. When Reagan
cut enforcement in 1981, the diffusion of these ofﬁces did not falter. As
further evidence that departments handling beneﬁts, health and safety,
and equal employment opportunity had become disassociated from policy,
over time, the policy-related covariates that predict adoption declined in
importance. Whereas at ﬁrst, employers with legal ofﬁces, those de-
pending on the primary labor market, and those in public and nonproﬁt
sectors were establishing these ofﬁces, by the 1980s, all sorts of employers
were doing so.
Does this mean that the employment rights revolution has been an un-
mitigated success? While these ofﬁces continued to diffuse even during
the Reagan years, there is evidence that cuts in enforcement led employers
to circumvent the law. Employers raided pension funds in response to
weakened enforcement of ERISA (Achenbaum 1986, pp. 155–56) and cut
afﬁrmative action programs in response to weakened enforcement by the
OFCCP (see Bureau of National Affairs 1976, 1986). Moreover, due to
the nonuniversal coverage and spotty enforcement of these laws, many
workplaces continue to have few protections against discrimination, inad-
equate safety measures, and no pension or health coverage.
We found managers identifying market forces as the source of struc-
tures they had adopted to comply with the law, thereby reinforcing the
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authority of the market and sapping the authority of the state. This pat-
tern helps to explain the federal government’s combination of administra-
tive weakness and normative strength, which has puzzled students of the
state (e.g., Evans et al. 1985). We contend that the pattern is found in
business regulation more widely, notably in antitrust law. After antitrust
law forced ﬁrms to adopt new business practices, industry invented efﬁ-
ciency explanations for those practices. As James Q. Wilson (1980) argues,
the Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890, adopted to protect the rights of small
business by undermining cartels, spawned price competition. Business
soon replaced the cooperative theory of the modern economy, which de-
ﬁned the cartels of the 1880s as efﬁcient, with a natural selection theory,
which deﬁned new price competition as efﬁcient (Dobbin 1994). As Neil
Fligstein (1990) argues, the Celler-Kefauver Act of 1950, adopted to un-
dermine the power of vertically integrated ﬁrms, caused ﬁrms to expand
into unrelated ﬁelds. Business soon replaced the coordination and control
theory of the ﬁrm, which deﬁned vertical links as efﬁcient, with portfolio
theory, which deﬁned conglomeration as efﬁcient.
This pattern, in which Americans develop collective amnesia about the
state’s role in shaping private enterprises, may explain the long absence
of a theory of the state in organizational sociology. Americans subscribe
to the theory that ﬁrms operate in a Hobbesian economic state of nature,
in which behavior depends very much on managerial initiative and mar-
kets and very little on political initiative and law. We argue that this the-
ory of the ﬁrm is a consequence of the administrative weakness of the
federal state, which in the process of constructing public authority as illicit
and policy as inconsequential, constructs market authority as legitimate
and managers as prepotent.
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